As America struggles to figure out how we will pay for all our obligations, aspirations, and expectations in the world and at home, political leaders and public servants look for ways to cut budgets while maintaining services. Duplications are anathema in this fiscal environment. So, why do we need an Army/Air National Guard AND an Army/Air Force Reserve?
It seems like an awful duplication of bureaucracies: there are separate headquarters and administrative systems for the Guard and the Reserve. There is only one reserve for the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Why are there two for the Army and Air Force?
Part of the answer is in the Founders' fear of central governmental authority. Seventeenth century England had seen Parliament's army take over the government and behead the king. The men at Independence Hall in 1787 were familiar with that history - not terribly distant to them - and meant to ensure that the Congress ad the Presidency they created would not be able to run roughshod over the nation: The President is commander in chief of the military; Congress appropriates military funding; and the states retain considerable militia forces. Hence, the Guard. In 1947, when the Air Force won independence from the Army, it was natural that its air units went along as well.
The Army Reserve - and in 1947, the Air Force Reserve - grew out of the distrust the regular army had for the Guard. They had seen too many political generals, too many brothers in law, and too many fiascos. While many Guardsmen had distinguished themselves in war, many failed badly. Political appointees and militiamen all too interested in fancy titles were the bane of the regular army's leaders in the nineteenth century. Forgotten militia generals in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War fell short in the field. One thinks of Ben Butler and John McClernand in the Civil War, and of too many Guard generals in the opening months of World War II, men who were well connected but poorly trained. The only Guard general who came all the way through World War II with his command and reputation intact was Ohio's Robert Beightler. Other men succeeded at lower levels, or in staff positions. But most of the Guard unit commanders in 1940 were canned.
Today's Guard is much more combat capable, its leaders better vetted, its equipment much better aligned to that of the active component. In short, many of the reasons for having two reserve component entities have dissolved.
It would save millions if we simply eliminated the duplicative headquarters structures of the Air Force Reserve (an Air Staff role at the Pentagon), the Air Force Reserve Command (a major command at Robins AFB, Ga), and the Air National Guard (at Joint Base Andrews, Md). Dozens of senior officer billets could be eliminated as well. The same would be true of the Army Guard and Reserve.
Guard and Reserve units are ideal for homeland defense missions. They have engineer, transportation, communications, medical, and police capabilities. They can feed thousands in austere conditions, provide medical care in tents, and return a battered community to safe functioning in the worst emergencies. These capabilities are vital, whether the situation is a terrorsit attack, a tornado, or a toxic chemical spill. Many of the units are Reserve forces, much less readily available to governors and local officials than Guard units. Let the states pick up these homeland defense/ state mission costs and have the Federal contribution to the Guard focus on the warfighting mission. On the Air side, it would necessitate shifting missions: why does the Ohio Guard need F-16s and KC-135s? Stocking the ANG with lots of tactical airlift makes great sense. The C-17, C-130, and C-27 all seem ideal for the homeland mission and have great utility in wartime.
The biggest issue is getting leadership to make the tough calls to enact these changes. It amazes me that military leaders who have exhibited great courage in combat frequently display moral cowardice when faced with hard, institutional level decisions.
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